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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case involves an appeal from the District Court for New
Union Island. R. at 1. Jurisdiction was proper in the district court
because this is a claim arising under the ATS. 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2018). The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit
has jurisdiction over this case because it is an appeal from a final
decision in a District Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(2018). The notice of appeal was filed in a timely manner. Fed. R.
App. 4(a).

ISSUES
1. Is there a ripe norm of international law that holds a domestic
corporation
liable
under
the
Alien
Tort
Statute?
2. Does the Trail Smelter Principle meet the high burden for
recognition as a principle of customary international law
enforceable as a “Law of Nations” under the Alien Tort Statute? 3.
3. Assuming the Trail Smelter Principle is customary international
law, does it impose obligations enforceable against nongovernmental actors?
4. Does the Clean Air Act’s displacement of federal common law
causes of action include Plaintiff’s Alien Tort Statute common law
claim
based
on
the
Trail
Smelter
Principle?
5. Does the Fifth Amendment’s substantive due process protections
create a cause of action against the United States Government to
protect the entire global atmospheric climate system?
6. Do Plaintiffs’ public trust claim and law of nations claim under
the Alien Tort Statute present a justiciable question that is
properly decided by the courts?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Organization of Disappearing Island Nations, Apa
Mana, and Noah Flood (“Plaintiffs”) brought this action against
Defendant HexonGlobal Corporation (“HexonGlobal”) for a claim
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and for violations of public
trust obligations. R. at 3. Plaintiff’s suit arose from their claim that
HexonGlobal’s fossil fuel related business activities are causing the
sea level around A’Na Atu and New Union Islands to rise so rapidly
that the islands will be completely uninhabitable by the end of this
century unless action is taken to limit emissions of greenhouse
gasses. R. at 3-4. On August 14, 2018, the District Court granted
HexonGlobal’s motions to dismiss. R. at 11. From that order,
Plaintiffs appeal. R. at 1.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant HexonGlobal is an American corporation,
incorporated in New Jersey, with its principal place of business in
Texas. R. at 5. It is the surviving corporation resulting from the
merger of all major United States oil producers. Id. HexonGlobal
and its predecessors have produced and sold fossil fuels globally
since at least the 1970s. Id. Plaintiffs Mana, Flood, and the
Organization of Disappearing Island Nations (ODIN) filed suit
against HexonGlobal and the United States (U.S.) alleging injuries
from greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global climate
change. Id. at 3–4. Mana is a foreign national from the island
nation of A ‘Na Atu and Flood is a U.S. citizen residing in the New
Union Islands, a U.S. possession. Id. at 3.
Plaintiffs allege that their homes will become uninhabitable
as a result of seal level rise caused by global climate change. Id. at
3–4. The damage to property and other harms cited by Plaintiffs
have already occurred, caused by the current rise in sea levels. Id.
at 5. Historically, the U.S. government heavily subsidized and
encouraged the production and use of fossil fuels. Id. at 5–6. The
U.S. is responsible for twenty percent of historical global
emissions. Id. at 6. HexonGlobal is responsible for six percent of
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global fossil fuel-related greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at 5.
Though HexonGlobal and its processors were aware that emissions
could contribute to sea level rise, the production and sale of fossil
fuels has been legal in the U.S. for the entire time period at issue
in Plaintiffs’ suit. Id.
Only recently has the U.S. government enacted policies to
limit emissions. Prior to 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) was not directed to regulate greenhouse gasses like
carbon dioxide as pollutants under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Id.
at 6. In 2009, the EPA began promulgating regulations limiting
emissions of greenhouse gases, including fuel efficiency standards
for cars and trucks, technology-based standards for new power
plants, and the “Clean Power Plan,” which limits emissions from
existing power plants and requires states to create emissions limit
plans. Id. at 6–7; Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 6466364664 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
These measures have only slightly reduced U.S. emissions. R. at 7.
Over the same period, global emissions have increased. Id.
The current Administration seeks to reverse many of the
EPA’s climate regulations, complicating domestic efforts to reduce
emissions. Id. at 7. New proposals freeze regulations for vehicle
fuel efficiency and repeal the Clean Power Plan. Id. at 7–8.
President Trump also announced the U.S. will withdraw from the
Paris Agreement, the most recent multilateral effort to commit
countries to nationally-determined emissions reduction targets. Id.
at 7. U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement becomes effective
in 2020. Id.
Plaintiff Mana seeks damages and injunctive relief under the
Alien Tort Statute alleging injury from the impacts of climate
change and sea level rise. Id. at 8. Mana claims production and sale
of fossil fuels contributes to transboundary harms and creates
liability for companies like HexonGlobal. Id. Plaintiff Flood brings
suit against the U.S. government for its historical support for fossil
fuels and for its failure to take action to limit greenhouse gas
emissions. Id. at 10. Flood alleges the federal government has
violated his Fifth Amendment substantive due process right
against government deprivation of life, liberty, and property based
on the public trust doctrine. Id.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, an Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claim cannot be brought
against a domestic corporation, as corporate liability is not a ripe
or universal norm under customary international law. Following
the guidance of traditional sources and Supreme Court dicta, no
norm of corporate liability has been internationally incorporated
so as to be customary international law. Imposing domestic
corporate liability directly opposes the Supreme Court’s emphasis
on a cautionary approach and causes practical issues in the
evaluation and consistent application of corporate liability within
ATS claims.
Second, the Trail Smelter principle does not establish a norm
that is specifically defined and universally abided by out of sense
of legal obligation so as to make it a recognized principle of
customary international law. No articulable or discernable
standards have been established in order to determine what
conduct would be considered customarily harmful. Additionally, no
legal obligations exist within the many sources of international law
that have implemented the Trail Smelter Principle. Instead, these
documents serve only as guide for the United States that has not
been historically enforced and is not enough to raise the principle
to the level of a customary international law.
Third, even if the Trail Smelter Principle were found to be
customary international law, the plain language of the ATS
imposes no obligations against non-governmental actors. Only
violations with identifiable individual perpetrators should be held
liable under ATS. Where HexonGlobal is one of many contributors
to the harm, the principle under Trail Smelter cannot impose
liability. Ultimately, it is nations, and not individual actors like
HexonGlobal, that are responsible for any harm caused.
Fourth, any ATS claim based on the Trail Smelter Principle
has been displaced by the Clean Air Act (CAA) because the
Supreme Court has held that any federal common law right to
reduction of emissions of carbon dioxide falls under the statute. A
claim based on the ATS is not an exception to this displacement,
even if Plaintiff does not have an alternative remedy.
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Fifth, no cause of action based on substantive due process and
the principles of the public trust doctrine exists because there is no
fundamental right to a stable environment. The doctrine’s
foundational focus on navigable and tidal waters cannot be
expanded to encompass the climate atmospheric system because
the atmosphere is not a public resource that the doctrine can
govern. Additionally, the government has no affirmative duty to
ensure a stable environment or protect against actions from
private parties, and no exception applies to a public trust doctrine
claim. Even if an affirmative duty could be found, the public trust
doctrine applies only against the states.
Finally, both claims made under the ATS and the public trust
doctrine are properly decided by the courts because they implicate
traditional areas of judicial concern and do not satisfy the elements
necessary to find a political question. In evaluating an ATS claim,
a fact specific analysis allows courts to evaluate individuals’ claims
despite the politically charged context of the claim. The public trust
doctrine claim is also justiciable because it rests primarily on
constitutional grounds

ARGUMENT
This Court should not adopt a new rule under the ATS
allowing suits for injuries from climate change brought against
domestic corporations, nor should it allow suits alleging
substantive due process violations from government inaction on
climate change based on the public trust doctrine. The district
court dismissed both claims for failure to state a claim for relief. R.
at 10–11. Dismissal for failure to state a claim or a cause of action
is reviewed de novo. Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171,
1173 (5th Cir. 2006); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005).
Because there is no ripe norm of customary international law to
support Plaintiff’s ATS claim against HexonGlobal, nor is there a
Fifth Amendment due process right based on the public trust
doctrine to support Plaintiffs’ claim against the U.S., this Court
should affirm the dismissal of both claims for failure to state a
claim for relief.
I. PLAINTIFF CANNOT BRING AN ALIEN TORT
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STATUTE CLAIM AGAINST A DOMESTIC CORPORATION
BECAUSE CORPORATE LIABILITY IS NOT A NORM OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) grants original jurisdiction
over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). The ATS is constitutionally based on the idea
that the law of nations has been adopted as part of the federal
common law, so any tort arising out of a violation of the law of
nations arises out of federal law. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). This Court should not adopt a new
rule that Plaintiff can bring an ATS suit against a domestic
corporation because corporate liability is not a ripe norm under
customary international law (CIL). Multiple policy and practical
reasons counsel against corporate liability. The Supreme Court has
not approved of domestic corporate liability under the ATS. The
Court should refrain from finding new applications for the ATS
given the serious implications of expanding its scope.
A. Corporate Liability is Not a Ripe, Universal Norm
Under Customary International Law.
Plaintiff cannot bring an ATS claim against a corporate
defendant because corporate liability is not sufficiently definite
and universal as to constitute a clear norm of customary
international law. Courts may only find jurisdiction for ATS claims
where the norm of CIL invoked is already “specific, universal, and
obligatory” as to constitute common law of the United States. Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712, 732 (2004). Norms ripen
under CIL when there is (1) “general and consistent practice of
states,” and (2) states follow the practice “from a sense of legal
obligation,” known as opinio juris. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, § 102(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1987)). Customary international
law provides both the substance of the cause of action under the
ATS and the scope of liability, including whether corporations can
be held liable. See Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 126; see also Jesner v. Arab
Bank, P.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018). In Sosa, the Supreme
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Court specifically questioned whether the norm of corporate
liability was sufficiently definite under international law. Sosa,
542 U.S. at 732 n.20. Fourteen years later, the Jesner Court again
expressed skepticism about the ripeness of the norm of corporate
liability, urging restraint towards expanding liability under the
ATS. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1399–1400. If this Court cannot establish
that a clear, universal norm of corporate liability already exists
under CIL, it should reject adopting a new rule of liability under
the ATS.
1. Traditional sources that courts use to discern
customary international law do not support a
norm of corporate liability.
No norm of corporate liability can yet be derived from the
traditional sources of evidence that courts use to identify the
substantive rules of customary international law. Courts look to a
variety of sources to determine whether state practices have
ripened into clear norms of CIL: the “customs and usages of
civilized nations,” “works of jurists and commentators”
experienced in the relevant practices, and judicial tribunals
“recognizing and enforcing” these customs. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
880–81 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
The Second Circuit in Kiobel I conducted a thorough investigation
of these sources, and the Supreme Court lauded its analysis and
precisely tracked its examples in Jesner. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at
1396–1402.
An exhaustive review of the major international tribunals, the
work of “publicists” (commentators), and possibly relevant treaties
finds no “discernible, much less universal” agreement among
states that corporations are liable for violations of customary
international law. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 145. First, no international
tribunal has ever found a corporation liable for a violation of CIL.
Id. at 132. The prominent tribunals representing agreed norms of
international law have limited jurisdiction to exclude corporations
or “legal persons.” Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial
Lawmaking, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 353, 379 (2011). The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Nuremberg Tribunals all
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reject jurisdiction over corporations, with the Nuremberg trials
explicitly charging corporate executives as individuals, rather than
exerting jurisdiction over the company itself. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at
1400–01; Kiobel I, 621 F.3dat 133–37; Ku, supra, at 380–82.
Additionally, the two major world courts, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), only
assert jurisdiction over individuals and not over corporations.
Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 136–37, 139–40. Proposals to include
corporate liability in the Rome Statute, establishing the ICC’s
jurisdiction, were rejected because of a “deep divergence” in views
on the issue. Id. at 137. Second, where individual treaties have
subjected corporations to liability, they are limited to their subject
matter and are not evidence of a broad norm under CIL. Id. at 138.
The ICJ has specifically stated that corporate liability in a
“handful of specialized treaties cannot be said to have a
‘fundamental norm-creating character.’” Id. at 139. Third, the work
of scholars leans against a norm of corporate liability, despite being
less homogenous than previous sources. Id. at 143–45, 144 n.48.
Most proponents of corporate liability write to provide normative
support for the idea, rather than describing the current state of
CIL. Id. at 144 n.48; Ku, supra, at 374. Scholars that support
corporate liability often cite the assessment of scholarly work in
Judge Leval’s concurrence in Kiobel I, but he concludes that the
rules of international law “do not provide for any form of liability
of corporations.” Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 181–86 (Leval, J.,
concurring). Taken together, the primary sources courts use as
evidence for finding universal norms under CIL do not
demonstrate a ripe norm of corporate liability.
2. This Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s
approach and is not bound to follow other
circuits that have found liability.
This Court should align itself with the Second Circuit and find
corporate liability is not ripe under international law, despite the
presence of a circuit split. Supreme Court dicta in Sosa and Jesner
clearly lean towards the Second Circuit’s finding of no norm of
corporate liability, in opposition to the findings by the Seventh,
Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. Jesner, 138 S.
Ct. at 1396 (citing Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d
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1013, 1017–21 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Nestle USA (Doe I), 766 F.3d
1013, 1020–22 (9th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Doe III),
654 F.3d 11, 40–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–36;
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
This Court should adopt the position that most closely reflects the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, while avoiding compounding the
errors reached by other circuits. Circuits finding corporate liability
under the ATS have erred in multiple ways, including: (1)
declaring a rule of CIL where one is not actually universally
accepted; (2) considering themselves “bound” by previous cases
that did not address the legal issue and thus have no precedential
weight; or (3) relying on a faulty distinction between international
substantive obligations and domestically authorized remedies.
These problematic approaches explain the major ATS decisions in
most other circuits. First, the Sosa Court instructed lower courts
to avoid “seek[ing] out and defin[ing] new and debatable
violations” of CIL. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728. However, several circuits
do just that by relying on the absence of a universal norm barring
corporate liability, rather affirmatively finding than the presence
of a universal norm supporting liability—in essence, “gap-filling”
where CIL is difficult to determine. Ku, supra, at 391. This error
reflects the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Doe I, finding that “the
absence of decisions finding corporations liable does not imply that
corporate liability is a legal impossibility.” Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1021
(emphasis added). Second, no precedent binds future courts when
cases do not affirmatively resolve the legal issues that “merely lurk
in the record.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1418 n.4 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). Some courts “did not analyze the question at all” in
ATS suits brought against corporations. Ku, supra, at 366–67.
When a court passes on a jurisdictional issue “sub silentio,” other
courts are not required to follow those decisions in a later case.
Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 124 (majority opinion). The Eleventh Circuit’s
ATS rule in Romero developed in this fashion, holding that it was
“bound” by the precedent of corporate liability established in
Aldana, even though that opinion did not analyze corporate
liability at all. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (citing Aldana v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1242 (11th Cir.
2005)). Third, the Supreme Court rejected the distinction that CIL
provides the substantive legal rights under the ATS, while
domestic law provides the remedies. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402
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(majority opinion). The Seventh Circuit incorrectly relied on this
distinction in Flomo. 643 F.3d at 1020– 21 (finding “no objection”
to corporate civil liability because a few treaties authorize
variation in domestic enforcement methods). This Court is not
bound to adopt one circuit court’s rule over another, and it should
not follow a circuit whose inquiry into the substantive provisions
of CIL is lacking.
B. The Practical Concerns Raised by a New Rule
Imposing Domestic Corporate Liability Outweigh
the Potential Benefits and Alternatives Exist for
Plaintiff.
A new rule imposing domestic corporate liability under the
ATS raises serious practical concerns for courts that warrant
judicial caution. Adjudicating ATS claims against domestic
corporations poses difficulties for courts resolving disputes when
the underlying international law norms provide minimal direction.
Further, Plaintiff has sufficient alternative forms of relief.
First, practical problems will arise for courts adjudicating ATS
claims against corporate defendants because there are few
examples under CIL for courts to look at for substantive legal
guidance. For example, international law has yet to develop clear
standards for vicarious liability as it applies in a civil context. Ku,
supra, at 388. Courts struggle with evaluating agency theories of
liability given “the utter lack of customary international law
standards for ‘piercing the corporate veil.’” Ku, supra, at 388. How
would courts determine the mens rea of a corporation for an intent
crime? Is liability imputed to shareholders of publicly traded
companies? How would civil or criminal punishments be imposed
on a corporation? CIL does not have clear norms of corporate
liability to answer these questions. See Ku, supra, at 389. Seeking
answers invites the judicial experimentation the Supreme Court
cautions against.
Second, this Court does not need to adventure into fashioning
new rules because foreign plaintiffs can already bring ATS suits
directly against individuals for actions taken while working for a
corporation. Rejecting domestic liability, the Second Circuit noted
that “individual liability under the ATS is wholly consistent” with
rejecting a rule of corporate liability. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 148. ATS
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suits can be brought against individuals who violate international
law, including the “employees, managers, officers, and directors of
a corporation.” Id. at 122. This Court does not need to adopt a new
rule imposing corporate liability because international law holds
individuals liable for acts committed under the color of their
employment.
II. TRAIL SMELTER IS NOT A RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLE
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW BECAUSE IT IS
NOT SPECIFIC, UNIVERSAL, OR OBLIGATORY.
Courts define the law of nations by interpreting customary
international law. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). The burden to establish
a norm of customary international law is on the party wishing to
invoke it. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 120-21. Customary international
law only includes “those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting
the relationships between states or between an individual and a
foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good
and/or in dealings inter se.” Id. at 118 (emphasis in original). The
Second Circuit has gone as far as stating that the ATS only applies
to “shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized
principles of international law.” Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691,
692 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam). For an offense to violate the law of
nations, the international norm must be “specific, universal, and
obligatory.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1399.
A. The Trail Smelter Principle Does Not Establish a
Norm That is Specifically Defined and Universally
Abided by States Out of a Sense of Legal
Obligation.
The Supreme Court has noted that new principles proffered as
the present-day law of nations must be “defined with the specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [they]
have recognized.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (referring to violation of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy). Therefore, for an action to qualify as an offense of the law
of nations, the basis must be a well-established, universally
recognized norm of international law.” See id. These customary
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international laws are only “rules that States universally abide by,
or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.”
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003).
Laws or practices that are “adopted for moral or political
reasons . . . do not give rise to rules of customary international
law.” Id.
A legal norm is not part of customary international law merely
because it is found in most or all nations. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 118.
A wrong must be “of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by
means of express international accords” before it is recognizable as
international law punishable by the ATS. Id. Courts should
exercise “vigilant doorkeeping” and ensure principles meet a high
bar before recognizing new private causes of action for violations
of international law. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398; Sosa, 542 U.S. at
729. When doing so, a court must consider the “practical
consequences of making a cause available to litigants in the federal
courts.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33.
A proffered legal norm is not specifically defined and
universally abided by out of a sense of legal obligation so as to
qualify as a customary international law if it asserts general
propositions with little to no actual definitions and does not
establish articulable and discernable standards. See Flores, 414
F.3d at 233; Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167
(5th Cir. 1999). For example, in Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., the
Second Circuit held that the asserted rights to life and health made
by plaintiffs who claimed that pollution from an American mining
company caused their lung disease were “insufficiently definite” to
qualify as rules of customary international law when the
statements relied on by the plaintiffs were merely “virtuous goals”
that did not define what actions fell in or outside the law. 414 F.3d
at 254–55. Similarly, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit held that the sources of international law cited by the
plaintiff in their claim against a mining company for allegedly
engaging in environmental abuses merely referred to “a general
sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract rights and
liberties devoid of articulable and discernable standards.” 197 F.3d
at 167.
On the other hand, a legal norm is specific and universally
abided by out of a sense of legal obligation so as to qualify as a
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customary international law when the norm is explicitly defined
and sets out standards for what conduct is and is not
reprehensible. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820);
Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 317– 19
(D. Mass. 2013); John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d
988, 1020–21 (S.D. Ind. 2007). For example, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Smith defines piracy, one of the first international
norms recognized by the Sosa court, as actionable under the ATS.
18 U.S. at 161. The Court states that there is “no doubt” as to what
is understood as the crime of piracy, and it analyzes reports from
several scholars and world leaders, and court cases. Id. at 163
n.8. Similarly, in John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., the court
addressed the issue of forced child labor on a plantation. 492 F.
Supp. 2d at 988. The court outlined the explicit standards for the
minimum age for different types of work in different nations found
in the International Labour Organization Convention (“ILO
Convention”). Id. at 1020–21. The U.S. has implemented and
adhered to these norms through statements from the U.S.
Department of State, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and
an international convention the U.S. has ratified. Id. at 1020–22.
The Trail Smelter Principle is not an enforceable rule of
customary international law because it is merely a virtuous goal,
devoid of articulable and discernable standards. The
“responsibility to ensure” that activities in one jurisdiction do not
harm the environment of another jurisdiction gives no further
guidance or definition, similar the vague references to a right to
life or health in Flores. See Flores, 414 F.3d at 245–55; R. at 9.
Neither the Stockholm Declaration nor the Rio Declaration outline
explicit standards for the environmental protection process which
must be implemented, unlike the minimum age for child worker
standards in the ILO Convention. See Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d
at 1020–21. Just as the plaintiff in Beanal relied on the Rio
Declaration, Plaintiffs cannot show that the treaties implementing
and reasserting the Trail Smelter Principle “enjoy universal
acceptance in the international community” or that the treaties
refer to more than “a general sense of environmental responsibility
and state abstract rights or liberties devoid of articulable or
discernable standards and regulations to identify practices that
constitute international [ ] abuses or torts.” See Beanal, 197 F.3d
at 167; R. at 9.
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Finally, the court must consider the practical consequences of
making this claim available to plaintiffs in federal courts. Sosa,
542 U.S. at 732. Because the Trail Smelter Principle does not
outline any standards for which actions are or are not actionable,
allowing plaintiffs to bring suit for any environmental damage a
potential defendant may cause to the environment of another State
would open up the floodgates to a massive amount of litigation.
Who would be sued next— every car manufacturer who contributes
to fossil fuels emissions, and every real estate developer who cuts
down trees and decreases the amount of oxygen they produce?
Allowing a cause of action in federal courts with such little
guidance simply is not practical.
B. The Sources of International Law Implementing the
Trail Smelter Principle are not Obligatory.
Courts must interpret the scope of the law of nations based on
laws as they exist today. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. When there is
no treaty, executive, judicial, or legislative act, the law of nations
is found by “consulting the work of jurists, by following the general
practice of nations, or by interpreting judicial decisions enforcing
these laws.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. If declarations
of international norms are not in and of themselves binding, then
there must be evidence of state practice showing the norm has
developed into an obligatory requirement. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Agreements under international law implementing a
purported international norm are not obligatory when they are
non-self-executing, the U.S. has declined to ratify the document, or
if the documents are merely aspirational and were never intended
to be binding. See Flores, 414 F.3d at 233; Peiqing Cong v.
ConocoPhillips Co., 250 F. Supp. 3d 229, 234–35 (S.D. Tex. 2016);
Almon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). For example, in Flores, the Second Circuit found that
plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the instruments they relied on
established a legal rule prohibiting pollution when the plaintiffs
cited to two treaties which have not been ratified by the U.S., one
treaty the U.S. has specifically declined to ratify, and several
United Nations (“UN”) General Assembly resolutions which were
“merely aspirational and were never intended to be binding.”
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Flores, 414 F.3d at 258–59. Similarly, in Almon Metals, Inc. v. FMC
Corp., the court found plaintiff’s reliance on the Stockholm
Principles and Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
unpersuasive in their claim that chemicals used in the defendant’s
manufacturing process created a serious health and environmental
hazard. 775 F. Supp. at 671. The court stated that the Stockholm
Principles “do not set forth any specific proscriptions, but rather
refer only in a general sense to the responsibility of nations,” and
that the Restatement only iterates the U.S. view of the law of
nations, not a universal view. Id. at 671.
In contrast, sources of international law implementing a
purported international norm are obligatory when the United
States is a party to a universally accepted treaty or protocol, and
has taken steps to implement and enforce that norm in the United
States. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876; M.C. v. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp.
2d 127, 131 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
For example, in M.C. v Bianchi, the Optional Protocol on the
Rights of the Child, Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography, offered by the plaintiffs to show that punishing sex
trafficking is an international norm, was obligatory because the
Protocol was ratified by the United States, implemented in the
United States through two pieces of further legislation, and
enforced through courts across the United States. 782 F. Supp. 2d
at 131. Similarly, in Bridgestone, the court found that the
customary international law norm prohibiting child labor on
plantations was obligatory even though the U.S. did not ratify the
ILO Convention because the key source of international child labor
standards used by the ILO Convention was a Convention which
the U.S. had ratified, and the U.S. implemented those ideals
through the FLSA. Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1020–21.
In the case at hand, unlike Bianchi, the international sources
Plaintiff references as implementing the Trail Smelter Principle
are mere guidance principles and not obligatory so as to raise the
Principle to the level of a customary international law. See
Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 131. The Trail Smelter Arbitration, the
source of the Trail Smelter Principle, was a conflict and decision
between only two countries—United States and Canada. See Trail
Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (2006). Further,
the issue addressed by the Trail Smelter Arbitration was a specific
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source causing a specific type of damage. Id. The type of damage
Plaintiff claims cannot be exclusively or conclusively linked to
HexonGlobal because contribute only a fraction of global
emissions. R. at 5 (HexonGlobal is responsible for six percent of
global historical emissions).
The two UN conferences adopting and reasserting the Trail
Smelter Principle, the Stockholm Conference and the Rio
Declaration, were actually attended by the U.S., but neither
document contains any information about enforcement or
implementation of the Principle. See Almon, 775 F. Supp. at 671;
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.
151/26/REV.1
(VOL.1)(1992)
[hereinafter
Rio
Declaration]; U.N. Conference on the Human Environment,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, 5, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972)
[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. . While it is true that the U.S.
has implemented some of the ideas of the Trail Smelter Principle
through federal legislation, like the minimum age requirement in
Bridgestone, this case differs because the United States’ legislation
on clean air is made out of concern for the United States’ own
population. See Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1020–21. The
express purpose behind the Clean Air Act is, “to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(2018) (emphasis added). In fact, as evidenced by the President’s
plans to reverse domestic regulatory measures and international
commitments, the U.S. is in no way obligated to follow the Trail
Smelter Principle. R. at 7. Entertaining the possibility of
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement shows that the U.S. is
concerned with environmental issues within its own country, not
abroad. See R. at 7.
III. EVEN IF THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE IS A
NORM OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, IT DOES
NOT IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS SUCH AS
HEXONGLOBAL.
The plain language of the ATS does not contain any
requirement of state action. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 132. The
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nature and scope of liability is not defined by the ATS, instead it is
defined by the customary international law being enforced. Kiobel
I, 621 F.3d at 121–22. This means that international law governs
the scope of liability for violations of customary international law
under the ATS, not domestic law. Id. at 126; see Sosa, 542 U.S. at
732 n.20. Depending on the cause of action, the ATS can find either
a government or an individual liable. See Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 120
(“violations of human rights can be charged against States and
against individual men and women but not against jurisdictional
persons such as corporations.”).
Violations with individual identifiable perpetrators should be
held liable under the ATS. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844,
846 (11th Cir. 1996); Chavez v. Carranza, No. 03-2932 M1/P, 2006
WL 2434934, at *11 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2006), aff’d, 559 F.3d 486
(6th Cir. 2009). For example, in Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a finding of liability on a former Ethiopian
government official for the torture and cruel, inhumane treatment
of the plaintiffs. 72 F.3d at 846. Similarly, in Chavez v. Carranza,
a suit was properly brought under the ATS against a former
Salvadoran military officer for the torture and extrajudicial
killings of plaintiffs and plaintiff’s family members that was
authorized by the military officer. 2006 WL 2434934, at *1.
In the case at hand, the Trail Smelter Principle, or the “noharm principle” as it is sometimes called, has had limited effect on
the climate regime. See Benoit Mayer, The Relevance of the NoHarm Principle to Climate Change Law and Politics, 19 Asia-Pac.
J. Envtl. L. 79-104, 6 (Oct. 9, 2016). Through the Rio and
Stockholm Declarations, States across the globe agreed to a
general goal of ensuring that activities within their jurisdiction do
not damage the environment of other states, without outlining any
particulars for how that goal was to be achieved or policed. See Rio
Declaration; Stockholm Declaration. Additionally, these
documents do not contain any language identifying who is liable
for activities that damage the environment of other states.
Although the original Trail Smelter Arbitration resulted in a
finding of liability on an individual Canadian company for damage
caused to individual residents in the U.S., this was a case where
the source of the harm could be pinpointed to a single company.
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1913–19. In the case at
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hand, HexonGlobal is not like the defendants in Negewo or
Carranza because HexonGlobal is a single contributor to an
activity rather than the sole contributor. See Negewo, 72 F.3d at
846; Carranza, 2006 WL 2434934, at *11. HexonGlobal is only
responsible for six percent of global historical emissions. R. at 5.
This means that other parties are responsible for ninety-four
percent of the cause of Plaintiff’s alleged harm.
Finally, in an advisory opinion by the International Court of
Justice, the court reinforces the idea that it is States who are
responsible for violations of the Trail Smelter Principle, not
individual actors. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8).
The court states that it is an “obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the
Trail Smelter Principle does not create a cause of action
enforceable against private actors such as HexonGlobal. If anyone
were to be liable for Plaintiff’s alleged harm, it would be the U.S.
government, not HexonGlobal.
IV. THE CLEAN AIR ACT DISPLACES ANY ATS CLAIM
BASED ON THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE
This Court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Plaintiff’s ATS claim based on the Trail Smelter Principle because
the Clean Air Act displaces the cause of action. R. at 9–10. The
Supreme Court in American Electric Power held that the Clean Air
Act (“CAA”) displaces any federal common law right to seek
abatement for emissions of carbon dioxide, mirroring its Clean
Water Act cases. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564
U.S. 410, 424 (2011). When Congress enacts a comprehensive
regulatory scheme to address a specific harm, any federal common
law cause of action addressing that harm is displaced by statute.
Id. at 419. As in AEP, Plaintiff’s ATS claim based on federal
common law is displaced by the CAA. No factor distinguishes an
ATS claim from any other claim at common law to render the
Court’s prevailing jurisprudence inapplicable. In fact, multiple
courts have grounded their displacement analysis in the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the federal common law in ATS cases. Courts
have also found common law cause of actions are displaced
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regardless of the type of remedy sought, whether or not the
legislation allows the plaintiff to bring a cause of action to enforce
the displacing statute. This Court should find that Plaintiff’s ATS
suit is displaced even if Plaintiff cannot seek alternative relief
under the CAA. R. at 10.
A. Plaintiff’s ATS Suit to Limit Emissions is Displaced
by the CAA Under the Rule Established in AEP.
Plaintiff’s ATS suit based on the Trail Smelter Principle is
displaced by the Clean Air Act, eliminating any source of redress
based on federal common law rights of action to limit emissions.
AEP, 564 U.S. at 424. Courts resort to applying federal common
law only “in absence” of an applicable statute. City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981). When Congress
addresses a question previously governed by federal common law,
the need for Court rulemaking “disappears.” Id. The test for
displacement asks whether the statute “‘speak[s] directly to [the]
question’ at issue.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 424 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). The AEP Court held
the CAA displaces any federal common law right to seek emissions
limits because the Act provides specific avenues for enforcement,
thus making judicial imposition of emissions limits inappropriate.
Id. at 425–28.
AEP’s displacement analysis applies to Plaintiff’s claim
because the ATS is purely a jurisdictional statute and does not
itself create any cause of action. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714; R. at 9–
10. In both its ATS and displacement cases, the Supreme Court
relies on the primacy of congressional lawmaking to determine
where a cause of action exists at federal common law. AEP, 564
U.S. at 426; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. Courts should not entertain
causes of action when Congress has provided a remedy or
contemplated other methods of redress outside of the ATS. Jesner,
138 S. Ct. at 1402. Lower courts have also specifically applied ATS
jurisprudence to their displacement analysis when finding the
CAA has displaced a cause of action. City of New York v. BP P.L.C.,
325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Jesner, 138 S. Ct.
at 1402); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024–
25, 1028–29 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402;
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728).
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Plaintiff’s cause of action is similar to the cases where lower
courts found that CAA displacement applies to all possible
remedies, regardless of the manner in which a defendant
contributed to global emissions. See Native Village of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2012); City of
New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 474–76; City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp.
3d at 1025, 1028; R. at 8–9. First, Plaintiff alleges harms from
HexonGlobal’s production and sale fossil fuels, like the claim held
displaced by the CAA in City of New York. 325 F. Supp. 3d at 476;
R. at 8–9. In City of New York, the plaintiff’s cause of action was
still displaced by the CAA even though the injury alleged was
defendants’ “worldwide production, marketing, and sale of fossil
fuels,” rather than the CAA’s main target for regulation—current
emissions from power plants. 325 F. Supp. 3d at 474–75. Second, a
court’s displacement analysis does not change based on the type of
relief sought. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857. When Congress displaces
a cause of action, all remedies that flow from it are also displaced.
Id. The CAA thus displaces claims for damages and injunctive
relief. Id. at 857–58 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
528-29 (2007)). In this case, Plaintiff seeks both damages and
injunctive relief, which are displaced. R. at 3.
B. This Court Should Find Displacement by the CAA
Even if Plaintiff Lacks an Alternative Remedy.
Potential legal objections to displacement of ATS claims based
on a congressional intent or a lack of remedy for Plaintiff are not
persuasive. First, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a
clear or express statement of displacement from Congress is
necessary for the courts to find the CAA displaces a federal
common law right of action. AEP, 564 U.S. at 423–24. Enacting a
comprehensive regulatory scheme is itself sufficient to show
Congress has “occupied the field.” Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317–
18. Second, availability of a federal remedy may be a factor in a
court’s initial displacement analysis, but lack of a remedy alone
does not justify any exceptions once a court finds statutory
displacement. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857. The “comprehensive
nature” of the CAA means Congress has spoken on the remedies
available for emissions, and “the lack of a federal damages remedy
is not indicative of a gap which federal common law must fill.” Id.
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at 866 (Pro, J., concurring). Neither the Supreme Court nor the
Ninth Circuit found lack of a remedy for the plaintiff alone is
sufficient to overwhelm the court’s finding of displacement. AEP,
564 U.S. at 422–23; Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857 (majority opinion).
Third, the “nonrestriction of other rights” language in the CAA’s
citizen suit provision does not imply that a federal common law
cause of action remains generally available. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e)
(2018). The Supreme Court held the Clean Water Act “as a whole”
displaces common law causes of action that might exist outside its
citizen suit provision, and the same is true for the CAA’s citizen
suit provision, which is worded identically to the Clean Water Act.
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 861 (Pro, J., concurring) (quoting Milwaukee
II, 451 U.S. at 328–29). Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2018) (Clean
Water Act’s citizen suit nonrestriction of remedy clause) with 42
U.S.C. § 7604(e) (Clean Air Act’s citizen suit clause).
This Court should thus affirm the district court’s holding that
Plaintiff’s cause of action is displaced by the CAA. R. at 9–10. The
Supreme Court’s displacement analysis finds no exception for a
claim based on the ATS or brought by a plaintiff who may be denied
the ability to bring an enforcement under the CAA.
V. NO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CAUSE OF ACTION
EXISTS UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTINE
BECAUSE THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A
STABLE ENVIRONMENT, NOR AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY
TO PROTECT THE GLOBAL CLIMATE SYSTEM.
No substantive due process right to a stable environment can
be found through the foundation of the public trust doctrine, as the
doctrine does not implicate the entirety of the climate system, it
does not apply to the federal government, and the government has
not caused any of the harm that would create a duty to protect the
global climate system. Any Fifth Amendment cause of action bases
itself on the deprivation of the interests of life, liberty, and
property. U.S. Const. amend. V. The public trust doctrine
fundamentally functions to protect certain property interests, but
does not serve as a basis for a claim that Plaintiff’s Fifth
Amendment right to property has been infringed.
Grounded first in Roman civil law and English common law,
the public trust doctrine considers things like air, running water,
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the sea, and the seashore to be in a common trust available to all
under natural law. J. Inst. 2.1.1. (J.B. Moyle trans.); Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1982). The doctrine focuses on the
idea that a sovereign government, such as a state government,
cannot grant away the title it holds to its natural resources that
are stored in a public trust for current and future beneficiaries. Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452. In American common law, the
doctrine has been strictly limited in its application to determining
the state’s property rights in submerged lands under navigable and
tidal waters. Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473–
76 (1988). The state’s ownership of these lands was found to be a
public trust and thus had to be compatible with the public interest
that favored public access to the lands. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S.
at 435; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1894). The limited
scope in which the doctrine has been applied, primarily to states,
cannot be applied here to create a fundamental right to a stable
climate through incorporation in the Due Process Clause, nor can
it be used to obligate the government to protect against actions by
private parties.
A. The Public Trust Doctrine Does Not Create a Cause
of Action Through the Due Process Clause Because
Its Principles Cannot Be Expanded to Find a Basis
for a Fundamental Right to Protect the Global
Climate System.
The public trust doctrine does not create a fundamental right
to a stable climate because the doctrine cannot properly be
expanded to protect the entire global climate atmospheric system.
Excluding the single exception of the recent Oregon district court
decision in Juliana v. United States, no court has so broadly
applied the public trust doctrine, limiting it to its primary focus on
the public’s interests in navigation and commerce. United States v.
Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 407 (1903); Juliana v. United
States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016), motion to certify
appeal denied, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705, at *1–2
(D. Or. June 8, 2017). State common law applications of the
doctrine, even in the broadest cases, have still focused specifically
on the public’s right to water resources. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr.
v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal. 2008)
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(extending the doctrine to “the planning and allocation of water
resources”); Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1002
(Haw. 2006) (applying Hawaii’s public trust doctrine to all water
resources in the state).
The public trust doctrine even in its most expansive form
cannot be applied to find a fundamental right to a stable climate
because the atmosphere, and by extension the global atmospheric
climate, is not a public use resource over which the doctrine can
govern. The novel conception of the entire atmospheric climate
system, a resource that exists within no confined bounds and is
affected by acts in every nation and jurisdiction, exceeds the scope
of the doctrine. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131,
1143 (9th Cir. 2013). Additionally, the atmosphere is not a resource
that is exhaustible and irreplaceable, which the public trust
doctrine was developed to and has historically addressed. See
Chernaik v Brown, No. 16-11-09273, 2015 WL 12591229, at *7
(Or.Cir. May 11, 2015) (citing Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands,
581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 (1979)).
The only case that found a basis for a fundamental right to
stable climate through the public trust principles, Juliana,
improperly expanded the public trusts doctrine’s principles. The
court found a fundamental right to a climate system capable of
sustaining human life. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250. However,
the court did not address the question of whether the atmosphere
was a public trust asset at that stage in litigation. Id. at 1255. The
court instead found that there was a public trust violation in the
territorial sea that related to the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 1256.
Here, despite Plaintiff’s alleged injuries relating to claims
regarding waters, they assert a fundamental right to the entirety
of a stable environment that exceeds the narrow scope of the
violation found by the Juliana court. See id. The court did not
address the right to a stable environment in the context of the
atmosphere or consider the entire climate as a public trust right,
instead relying primarily on an amalgamation of due process
rights, such as a fundamental right to privacy. See id. at 1249–51.
The singular holding of this court cannot be a basis to expand the
public trust doctrine to grant a protection of a fundamental right
to the atmospheric climate system as a whole.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/4

24

110

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 10

B. The Government has No Affirmative Duty to Ensure
a Stable Environment by Protecting Against
Private Party Actions and it Played No Role in
Creating the Danger.
The Due Process Clause cannot support Plaintiff’s cause of
action because it imposes no duty on the government to
affirmatively act to protect the environment, and no exception
applies because government did not create the danger. The
Supreme Court held that there is no affirmative duty for
government protection to address actions that have allegedly been
committed by private parties. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). Even if the claim were to
implicate securing liberty, life, or property interests, the Due
Process Clause does not compel the government to act or
affirmatively confer aid. Id. at 196-200. The Ninth Circuit has
applied an exception to this rule when the government has created
the danger that impacts due process. Id. at 201; Penilla v. City of
Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709–10 (9th Cir. 1997). The
elements for establishing government created danger are: (1) the
government’s acts created the danger to the plaintiff; (2) the
government knew its acts caused the danger; and (3) the
government with deliberate indifference failed to act to prevent the
alleged harm. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252 (quoting Penilla,
115 F.3d at 709); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992).
None of these elements are met in this case. This government
indifference must be the product of a culpable mental state and not
just gross negligence. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1251 (citing
Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016)).
The Ninth Circuit applied this danger creation exception
without DeShaney’s emphasis on the duty of care being triggered
when a person is in custody. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201; Grubbs,
974 F.2d at 121 (finding that custody of victim was not a
prerequisite for danger creation to apply where security custodial
was raped and terrorized by inmate), Penilla, 115 F.3d at 710
(finding that officers were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s
safety and placing him in danger by removing him from the
potential of medical care). These exceptions significantly
broadened DeShaney’s original exception, only in these extreme
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cases and do not provide a basis for a broad application of a
government caused danger exception.
In this case, even if the government caused danger exception
test was applied, the elements of the exception would not be met,
as the U.S. government did not actively create the danger,
particularly after becoming aware of the potential harm. When the
majority of the harmful emissions were being produced, the
government had no knowledge of the dangers of climate change. R.
at 6. Additionally, the government did not act culpably or with
deliberate indifference to prevent the harm. Instead, beginning as
early as 1992, the government has worked to adopt policies and
take measures specifically designed to mitigate climate change and
its effects, like establishing fuel economy standards and
greenhouse gases emission limits for passenger cars. R. at 6-7. The
government caused danger exception does not apply, and the
government has no affirmative duty to protect a stable climate
both under DeShaney and because there is no expansion of the
public trust doctrine that can incorporate protecting the entire
climate as a substantive due process right.
C. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
Provides No Basis for a Public Trust Doctrine Suit
Against the Federal Government Because the
Doctrine Only Applies to State Governments
The public trust doctrine imposes no duties upon the federal
government because it applies to state laws and state actors. Even
if a fundamental right or an exception to DeShaney is found, the
public trust doctrine’s historical incorporation into American law
only obligates state government action and does not broadly create
a federal cause of action. In the seminal case considering the
application of the public trust doctrine, Illionis Central, the
Supreme Court used the public trust doctrine to void the sale of
submerged land in Chicago harbor because the sale would harm
public interest. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co, 146 U.S. at 451–53. The Court
has made clear that the application of the public trust doctrine in
this case was “a statement of Illinois law” and not a statement of
federal law, limiting the doctrine’s application to solely be against
the state. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).
The Supreme Court recognizes that the public trust doctrine is not
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based on the Constitution, but rather that it “remains a matter of
state law” with no application to the federal government. See Alec
L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(citing PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235
(2012)); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.
261, 284–88 (1997) (treating the public trust doctrine as a matter
of state law); Phillips, 484 U.S. at 473–76 (similar). Though the
public trust doctrine has been implicated in some federal actions
regarding navigable and tidal waters, it has largely developed
almost exclusively as a matter of state law. Phillips, 484 U.S. at
476; District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1984). The courts that have applied the public trust
doctrine against the federal government applied it only in narrow
situations that are not relevant to this case. City of Alameda v.
Todd Shipyards, 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1986); United
States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981).
In these cases, the court focused solely on submerged lands and
held that where the U.S. has title to these lands, the transfer of it
does not violate the public trust doctrine that was applicable to it
under state law. City of Alameda, 635 F. Supp. at 1450; 1.58 Acres
of Land, 523 F. Supp. at 124. The application of the public trust
doctrine to the federal government in these cases still rested on the
original federal application to navigable and tidal waters,
providing no ground for broader expansion of the doctrine against
the federal government. See Alec L., 561 F. App’x at 8. Allowing
public trust principles to support a claim against the federal
government expands the doctrine past its intended scope to apply
solely to state governments, and so the doctrine cannot provide a
federal cause of action.
VI. THE LAW OF NATIONS CLAIM UNDER THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST CLAIM ARE
JUSTICIABLE QUESTIONS BECAUSE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ARE PROPERLY
ADJUDICATED BY THE COURTS
Plaintiffs’ claims under the Alien Tort Statute and Public
Trust Doctrine are justiciable political questions because the
issues addressed in each fall within the role of the judiciary, and
neither claim constitutes a political question under the factors of
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Baker v. Carr. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215–18 (1962). The
political question doctrine reflects the essential nature of the
separation of powers within a democracy by assigning different
duties to each branch of government. Id. Issues deemed to be
essentially political in nature cannot be decided by federal courts
as the courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
In Baker, the Supreme Court established six factors to
determine the presence of a political question: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question. Id. at
217. These six Baker factors are used to guide a case-by-case
analysis that often collapses some of the individual factors
together. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544 (9th Cir.
2005). Only when one of these factors is wholly inseparable from
the case should the court dismiss it as a nonjusticable political
question. Id. A case involving political issues or actions is not
automatically nonjusticiable. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana,
503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992).
A. Public Trust Doctrine Claims are Justiciable
Because They Allege Violations of Constitutional
Rights That are Properly Adjudicated by the
Courts
Courts have proper jurisdiction over claims made under the
Public Trust Doctrine because the doctrine does not specifically
implicate other branches of government, and the claim relies on
Constitutional foundations. Claims under the public trust
necessarily implicate both the executive and legislative branches,
through legislation and regulations of the assets within the public
trust, but the doctrine does not direct a specific action or process to
fulfill its protections. Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood,
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“No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 43–48 (2017). However,
these claims also implicate the judicial branch because the courts
have a role in protecting the beneficiaries of the public trust by
holding the legislative and executive branches accountable. Ariz.
Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine
Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 731–32 (Cal. 1983). Court intervention on
behalf of these beneficiaries does not impose policy decisions on the
other branches of governments, but enforces the obligations
already owed. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 440.
Public trust claims made within the context of climate change
do not impact the court’s authority to adjudicate the claim, as
public trust claims do not violate any of the six Baker factors that
set a high bar for courts to dismiss claims as nonjusticiable. Baker,
369 U.S. at 217. In the most recent public trust doctrine claim in
the context of the climate, the Juliana court found that the claim
did not raise a political question. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1235–
42. The Constitution has not textually allocated fundamental
power over managing public trust resources to any particular
branch, and the courts regularly adjudicate cases about the
climate, thereby satisfying the first Baker factor. Id. at 1238.
Public trust claims do not rest solely on statutory or regulatory
frameworks, instead focusing largely on the beneficiaries of the
public trust through examination of the constitutional rights that
affect those beneficiaries. Id. at 1238–40. Constitutional
interpretation is a traditional area of purview of the courts, and
resolving the scope of these rights does not require an initial policy
decision that would create a political question. Id. Courts therefore
have competence to hear public trust claims consistent with the
second and third Baker factors because the claim rests on a
constitutional claim of a deprivation of property, and does not
require initial policy decisions from the courts. Id. at 1239. It is
rare that the final three factors will make a case nonjusticable.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotosfsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 203–04
(2012). In analyzing the factors, the court in Juliana found that
none rendered the issue of a public trust claim a nonjusticable
question. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1240–41.
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Where courts have found that the political question doctrine
bars the courts adjudication of a climate change case, the rulings
improperly diminished the appropriate role of the judiciary. See
Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2004) (“Federal courts adjudicate claims against foreign
corporations every day and can consider the nation’s foreign policy
interests and international comity concerns in their decisions”); Aji
P. v. State, No. 18-2-04448-1, 2018 WL 3978310, at *1
(Wash.Super. Aug. 14, 2018). In Aji P., the court found a policymaking prerogative in the climate action plan that encroached on
the roles of the two political branches of government. Aji P., 2018
WL 3978310, at *3. Additionally, the political question doctrine
has mostly barred adjudication in cases implicating the Executive
Branch’s authority over foreign relations. Id. However, here,
environmental policy under the public trust doctrine is not an
inherently a foreign policy decision, nor is it relegated to the
legislature. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241. Some remedies
would require specific care to avoid separation of powers conflicts,
but the legal issues themselves are still properly addressed by the
courts. Id. at 1241–42. This public trust doctrine claim is properly
justiciable because the traditional role of the judiciary is to
interpret constitutional rights, protection of public trusts are not
exclusively relegated to any one branch of government, and no
other Baker factors suggest this case is non- justiciable.
B. The ATS Claim is Not Barred by the Political
Question Doctrine Because Interpreting the Scope
of the Law of Nations and Federal Causes of
Action are Traditional Judicial Functions.
The Alien Tort Statute claim does presents a justiciable
question for the courts because courts have historically adjudicated
ATS claims based on a case specific analysis and prioritization of
concurrent jurisdiction where claims have not been allocated to a
specific governmental branch. Law of nations claims under the
ATS, due to their inherent nature of international law, may have
implications on the country’s foreign relations. Kadic, 70 F.3d at
248–49. However, courts have routinely found that ATS claims are
within the judiciary’s proper role because claims that rise in a
politically charged context does not convert the claim necessarily
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into a non-justiciable political question. Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency,
673 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding no political question in
an ATS claim involving electronic surveillance); Klinghoffer v.
S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991); Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am, Inc. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 838 F.2d 649,
656 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding the political question doctrine did not
bar an ATS claim based on international funding for birth control
and abortion). Though the Sosa Court, in dicta, advocates for a
cautious judicial approach in addressing ATS claims so as to avoid
interfering with the political branches, lower courts have routinely
decided the merits of these cases, particularly when claims are
based on infractions by an individual. Alperin, 410 F.3d at 545;
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728. The ATS allows for judicial review by
authorizing courts to hear claims by individuals for violations of
international norms. Amy Endicott, The Judicial Answer?
Treatment of the Political Question Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims,
28 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 537, 551 (2010).
Courts have found in the majority of cases that when applying
a fact-specific analysis of ATS law of nations claims, the political
question doctrine does not apply. See Doe III, 654 F.3d at 11;
Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1151 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011). In
these cases, courts found that even though there were executive
branch foreign policy decisions implicated, these were insufficient
to render the claims nonjusticable. See Doe III, 654 F.3d at 11;
Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1151. Where courts have found the political
question doctrine renders an ATS case nonjusticable, they found
that it would require courts to directly decide national policy,
infringing on powers committed to the other branches. See
Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(holding court evaluation of measures taken by the U.S. to
implement U.S. policy in Chile would require policy decision
textually allocated to political branches); Robertson v. Republic of
Nicaragua, No. 17-cv-00852-JST, 2017 WL 2730177, *4 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (finding plaintiff’s complaint would require adjudication of
200 years of relationship between a people and a sovereign
government). Here, climate change has been addressed by all
branches and is not committed to a single branch or specific policy
approach, and thus is not subject to the political question doctrine
under the fact-specific elements of this claim.
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In applying the Baker factors, the Second Circuit in Kadic held
that the specific, statutory jurisdictional grant over ATS claims
satisfies the first three Baker factors. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249.
Existence of discoverable and manageable judicial standards in
ATS claims removes the need for the court to make policy
decisions. Id. Cases that touch on foreign relations are weighed on
a case-by-case basis to assess if judicial action is appropriate. Id.
The remaining Baker factors need only be addressed if the judicial
resolution of a question would contradict previous decisions made
by other branches. Id. at 249–50. Considering both the general
context of ATS claims and the specific case analysis required by
the Baker factors, Plaintiff’s law of nations claim does not implicate
the political question doctrine and can be properly decided by the
judiciary.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant HexonGlobal respectfully
requests this court to affirm the District Court’s decision
dismissing claims under the Alien Tort Statute and Fifth
Amendment for failure to state a claim for relief.
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